There are many ways of tackling tax evasion. The traditional strategies implemented by tax authorities fight fiscal fraud through audit and penalties. However, there also exist a plethora of unconventional methods, such as whistleblower programs. Although there is a rich economic literature on tax evasion, auditing and penalties, tax agencies' heavy reliance on whistleblower programs has mostly been ignored. We ran an experiment in which taxpayers can punish tax evaders by reporting them to the authorities, even though it is costly for them to do so and despite the lack of any material benefit from doing so. Information on other taxpayers' compliance rates together with the opportunity to report tax evaders has a positive and a very significant effect on the level of income reported. Observing the compliance rates of other participants alone does not suffice to increase tax revenues, while the mere threat of being reported significantly increases revenues.
"It is not always through the perfect goodness of virtue that one obeys the law, but sometimes it is through fear of punishment." Aquinas Every year, the government forgoes considerable sums in lost revenues, and the population suffers substantial welfare losses via reduced public services because of tax evasion. It is, therefore, important that our society understands the determinants of tax evasion and the effectiveness of the instruments that have been designed to curb it.
There are many ways of tackling tax evasion. The traditional strategies implemented by tax authorities consist in fighting fiscal fraud through audit and penalties. Following
Becker's seminal article in 1968, the economics of crime has traditionally focused on how the probability and severity of punishment deter potential criminal activities. 3 In the domain of taxation, Allingham and Sandmo (1972) and Yitzhaki (1974) developed related models in which taxpayers comply or evade taxes depending on the probability of audit and the amount of the fine in the case of an audit. Empirical work has confirmed the prediction of the Becker model, revealing a negative effect of deterrence variables on crime and fraud (See Polinsky and Shavell, 2000 , for a survey). 4 Apart from the traditional methods of deterring tax evasion, tax authorities also resort to less-conventional methods, including advertising campaigns to remind people of the Law, warnings about the consequences of tax evasion for cheaters, publishing the names of 3 In the traditional economics-of-crime approach, crime results from the comparison of the expected benefits and costs of illegal activities (Becker, 1968) . In Becker's model, extended by Ehrlich (1973) , criminals maximize their expected utility by comparing the monetary returns from the legal sector to the net expected gain from crime. 4 In the context of the firm, monitoring mechanisms have been widely studied in the accounting and control literature (e.g., Chow et al., 1988; Evans et al., 2001; Zhang, 2008) . Varying employee compensation can be an alternative to monitoring in deterring fraudulent behavior in firms. This may consist for instance in reducing employees' pay in the case of cheating such as theft (e.g. Greenberg 1990 ). On the contrary, efficiency-wage theory proposes that higher pay will yield higher productivity by i) inducing reciprocity, ii) reducing shirking and motivating employees to exert greater effort and iii) attracting higher-quality employees (Malcomson, 1981; Yellen, 1984; Shapiro and Stiglitz, 1984; Akerlof and Yellen, 1990; Fehr and Gachter, 2000a) . For instance, using data from the retail industry, Chen and Sandino (2012) find that relative wages are negatively correlated with employee theft after controlling for employee characteristics, monitoring and the socio-economic environment. delinquent taxpayers or other shaming techniques (See Kirsch, 2004) . 5 Tax agencies also often rely on whistleblower programs by paying informants to conduct tax investigations.
In the US, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) established the Whistleblower Office in 2006, which rewards people who blow the whistle on taxpayers who underreport their tax liabilities. 6 For instance, in the 2011 fiscal year, the IRS paid a total of $8 million to informants, who provided information that led to the collection of an additional $48 million in taxes and penalties. 7 In the same vein, the Australian Taxation Office (ATO) posted the following statement directly addressed to taxpayers on its website: "ATO is committed to targeting tax evasion, and you can help us make sure everyone pays his or her fair share of tax". The Italian government also introduced a similar program called evasori to curb tax evasion by encouraging citizens to report any known cases of tax evasion on an anonymous website. By the end of June 2010, 75,341 cases of fraud had been denounced, for a total of €18,367,338. 8 A similar whistleblower program has also been implemented in Greece by the Financial and Economic Crime Unit (S.D.O.E) and resulted in an increase in total fines from €1.7 billion in 2009 to €4.5 billion in 2012. 9 In this current paper, we attempt to investigate experimentally both the effectiveness of whistleblower programs as well as the determinants of peer reporting activities. 10 Whistleblower programs are based on the idea that agents themselves are often in a better position to observe each other, whereas such information may be costly for the principal to obtain. Researchers have long studied the potential value of information that one agent possesses about another's actions in the context of peer monitoring and peer reporting mechanisms (e.g., Kandel and Lazear, 1992; Barron and Paulson Gjerde, 1997) . This literature suggests that mutual monitoring systems can improve the principal's contractual position significantly at a relatively low cost if she can elicit information possessed by one agent about the other when agents can accurately observe each other. The principal may thus encourage peer reporting, and base each agent's compensation on the peer's report. In some cases, managers encourage peer reporting via appropriate remuneration schemes that invite employees to report their peers (Trevino and Victor, 1992; Barron and Paulson-Gjerde, 1997; Butlery et al., 2017) .
Our work is fourfold. First, we attempt to contribute to the existing literature on the effectiveness of whistleblowing in the specific context of tax evasion. While there are numerous papers on tax evasion dealing with auditing and penalties (e.g. Allingham and Sandmo, 1972; Yitzhaki, 1974; Hashimade et al., 2010; Kleven et al. 2011; Mazzolini et al., 2017) and the role of information (e.g. Cowell, 1990 and Andreoni et al., 1998) , whistleblower programs has mostly been ignored in the tax-evasion literature. 11 Notable exceptions are Yaniv (2001) and Mealem et al. (2008) . Yaniv (2001) presents a model in which individuals can decide to blow the whistle on tax evaders. Mealem et al. (2008) compares the tax agency's performance under a one-round blind-audit policy and a tworeluctance to report acts of noncompliance or ad hoc rationalizations for behavior (See Mascagni, 2016 for a review of experiments on tax evasion).In general, experiments on tax evasion tend to support the hypothesis that the expected punishment (that is, the size of sanctions discounted by the probability of audit) is important (for example, Guala and Mittone, 2005) . Alm et al. (1992) report that uncertainty over the probability of audit can increase compliance. Among others, Clark et al. (2004) present experimental results showing that biased estimates of audit probability explain the extent of voluntary compliance. Johnson et al. (2010) provide insights using an experimental approach to evaluate the effects of sales-tax monitoring and the determinants of sales-tax compliance. The results indicate that if comprehensive monitoring is instituted without complementary policies, an increase in tax revenues is unlikely. The reason is that individuals may try to recover their losses following any policy changes, even if this means taking more risks. Lefebvre et al. (2013) , Luttmer and Singhal (2014) and other experimental contributions suggest that tax morale plays an important role, even though the effects are difficult to measure. Hallsworth et al. (2017) appeal to natural field experiments to show how social-norm messages can enhance tax compliance. 11 Slemrod (2016) , who reviews new research on tax compliance and enforcement policies at length, does not mention those programs. round whistleblowing-intensive policy that allows whistleblowers to denounce tax evaders.
They find that the tax agency is better off running a two-round whistleblowing. Bazart et al. (2017) investigate experimentally the efficiency of whistleblowing by comparing a benchmark treatment with treatments in which taxpayers can blow the whistle. The authors show that whistleblowing programs decrease significantly tax evasion. In this current paper we attempt to contribute to this relatively small but growing literature on the efficiency of whistleblowing programs on tax compliance.
The second aim of this paper is to investigate the determinants of whistleblowing decisions, in absence of monetary rewards. Some previous work has shown that agents may be willing to report those who deviate from the norm to the principal in the context of a principalagent relationship (e.g., Shaw, 1971; Trevino and Victor, 1992) . Some models have considered such settings, where each agent observes the other agent's action and can truthfully report it to the principal (Demski et al., 1988; Fischer and Hughes, 1997) . In these incentive schemes, the agents are compensated based on their peer's report (Ma, 1988 , Zhang, 2008 . 12 However, less is known about the nonmonetary factors behind peer reporting mechanisms. A notable exception is Yaniv (2001) who highlighted from a theoretical point of view the role of non-monetary factors such as the willingness to take revenge with a former close party in producing incentives to inform. 13 In this current paper we aim at contributing to the existing literature by examining the determinants of peer reporting activities despite the absence of monetary rewards.
The third aim of this paper is to test whether the willingness to report tax evasion to the central authority is influenced by how the government uses tax revenues. Previous studies have shown that the efficiency of the state (i.e., the return in term of public expenditures from tax collection) may be an important determinant of tax compliance (e.g., Wenzel, 12 For instance, Ma (1988) sets out the conditions under which the principal can achieve the first best by implementing a peer-reporting system. Zhang (2008) investigates how the agent's fairness perception of the principal and inter-agent communication affect the honesty of agent behavior under a peer-reporting system. 13 According to Yaniv (2001) , the main reason why people denounce tax evaders is not the pecuniary reward but the desire to obtain revenge against employers, spouses or any norm deviators. Yaniv suggests that this helps explain why the IRS is so tightfisted in rewarding informants who help recover taxes. Yaniv (2001) shows that the bounty rate is relatively low and averaged under 2 percent of the amount recovered by the IRS in the US over the 1992-96 period.
2002; Alm and Torgler, 2006) . For instance, previous studies have shown that efficient institutions may induce less tax avoidance because citizens feel that they are receiving something (i.e., high-quality public services) in return for their money Frey and Torgler, 2007; Torgler and Schneider, 2007) . In contrast, citizens may be more likely to avoid taxes, when they perceive that a non-negligible part of the collected revenue is burnt. For instance, Alm et al. (1992) found that some individuals may be willing to pay taxes because they value the goods provided by the government. We conjecture here that knowing that taxes will not be squandered but instead invested in a program that induces positive externalities may have a positive impact not only on tax compliance but also on the willingness to report fraud.
The fourth aim of this study is to isolate the pure effect of monitoring of tax evasion from peer reporting. Indeed, peer reporting mechanisms require monitoring of others and monitoring by itself may affect behaviors. Whether the introduction of monitoring will lead to more or less shirking is a prior unclear. Some studies have reported a positive effect of monitoring because observability may shame tax evaders (e.g., Corricelli et al., 2010) . 14 In sharp contrast, other studies have reported negative effect of observability due to mimicry: seeing other group members cheating profusely may incite individuals to cheat more due to mimicry (see Fortin et al., 2007) . In this current study, we aim at contributing to this existing literature on the effect of monitoring on tax evasion.
Our experimental design is a 3X2 design. In our baseline treatment at each period of the game, participants receive an income and are asked to declare their total income and pay the corresponding tax. When audits reveal that participants have underreported their income, they are obliged to pay taxes on the undeclared income and a penalty. Our second treatment (called monitoring treatment) is similar to the baseline treatment except that, in each period, subjects are informed of the declared income rates of the three other group members, but have no opportunity to report tax evaders. The comparison of the treatments with and without information allows us to test how monitoring per se affects both the 14 Corricelli et al., 2010 observed that an auditing policy that shames tax evaders by publishing pictures of them reduces fraud. degree of tax compliance. Our third (called peer-reporting) treatment is identical to the information treatment except that, in each period, a new step is added in which, after having observed the declared income rates of all group members, each participant can anonymously report tax evasion to the central authority. This treatment allows us to measure the pure effect of peer reporting on tax compliance ; it also allows us to test whether individuals are willing to report fraud to the central authority despite the absence of any monetary rewards to do so.
In all of these three treatments above, participants are not informed about how tax revenues are used. Thus, in these treatments, tax revenues may be perceived by the taxpayers as "wasted" or "burnt" in the sense that they do not finance public goods or services (and thus do not generate positive externalities) through the government budget. It can be perceived as a leviathan situation where no tax revenue is redistributed to the taxpayers (Brennan and Buchanan, 1980) . To test whether the perception of how tax revenue is used influences both tax compliance and the desire to report tax evasion to the central authority, we ran variants of the three treatments above in which participants were told that the tax revenue was used to finance an environmental public good. Concretely, participants were informed that the taxes were used to buy carbon credits for environmental protection as a proxy of a global environmental public good.
To anticipate our results, we find that: (1) monitoring alone does not increase the incomedeclaration rate; (2) the opportunity to report tax evaders has a positive and highly significant effect on the level of income reported; and (3) information on how taxes are spent (i.e. whether burnt or used to fund a global environmental public good) has no significant impact on either tax compliance or peer reporting.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents our experimental design. Section 3 shows the theoretical predictions and behavioral conjectures. Section 4 provides an analysis of the experimental data. Finally, Section 5 discusses our results and concludes.
Experimental design, theoretical predictions, and behavioral conjectures

Treatments
Our experiment consists of six treatments. Our baseline treatment is inspired by Johnson et al. (2010)'s taxation game. The participants play 20 periods of the baseline treatment. In each period, participants are asked to declare their total income and pay a 40% tax on their declared income. This tax rate is the same for all declared incomes. Each member of a group of 12 receives an income ranging from 20 to 100 EMU (experimental monetary units) randomly drawn by the computer at each period of the game. 15 Participants are informed that the government does not know their income, and has to audit their account to obtain this information. However, this operation is costly. The government therefore only audits accounts randomly. Following Johnson (2010), the probability of being audited is determined as follows: i) If the reported income is in the bottom 50% of declared incomes, the probability of being audited is 20%; and ii) If the reported income is in the top 50% of declared incomes, the probability of being audited is 10%. An audit finding fraud will automatically trigger audits of the previous two periods. All participants are informed of this. If incomes are underreported, the participants are charged 1.5 times the standard tax rate on the income evaded in each period. In case tax evasion is detected, the penalty rate is an additional 50% of this 40% (for a penalty-tax rate of 60%).
The second treatment (called "monitoring" treatment) is similar to the baseline except that, in each period, subjects are informed of the declared income rates of the three other group members (each group of 12 was e divided up into three groups of four members). This treatment allows us to examine the effects of monitoring on tax compliance.
The third treatment ("peer-reporting") is identical to the monitoring treatment, except that a new step is added. After having observed the declared income rates of all group members, each member can anonymously report any observed tax evasion to the central authority. In this treatment, peer reporting of tax evasion is costly: each report costs 2 EMUs. Tax evaders who are reported to the central authority are automatically audited and subject to a penalty. In our peer-reporting treatment, the tax authority does not reward informers. This allows us to test whether the sole desire to punish those who do not comply with the Law is sufficient for participants to report evaders. 15 In any given period, this amount is identical for all group members (although they do not know this).
For each of these three treatments, we implemented a variant in which participants were informed that the taxes collected would be used fund a global public good. Precisely, participants were told that after the experiment, one period would be randomly chosen by the computer and the total taxes collected for this period by the 12 participants would be used to purchase carbon credits on the online website http://planetair.ca. 16 It was explicitly noted in the instructions that one ton of "Gold Standard carbon offset" costs about $40 and is the highest quality in this domain (see http://www.cdmgoldstandard.org).
Procedure
Overall 432 participants (72 per treatment) participated in this experiment (see Table 1 ). The subjects were recruited from undergraduate courses in Business and Economics. Some subjects had participated in previous experiments, but all subjects were inexperienced in this particular type of experiment. No subject participated in more than one session.
Sessions lasted an average of 90 minutes, including initial instructions and payment. The experiment was programmed in Delphi. Table 1 below summarizes our different experimental treatments. 
Theoretical predictions
Standard theoretical predictions
We first assume that individuals are selfish and attempt to maximize their payoff. The theoretical prediction for the baseline treatment is then straightforward. To calibrate the baseline treatment, we refer to the seminal model developed by Allingham and Sandmo (1972) and Yitzhaki (1974) , which builds on the expected-utility model. In the baseline treatment, a risk-neutral participant should never report a positive income. 17 The same prediction applies to the monitoring treatment since treatments with monitoring are identical to the baseline except that participants can now observe the declared rates of their fellow group members. In the peer-reporting treatment, the only subgame-perfect equilibrium of the game, whether played once or finitely repeated, is not to report peers in stage 2, since reporting is costly, and to evade taxation as in the baseline in stage 1.
Finally, regarding with variant of our games with credit carbon, predictions are also straightforward : adding the information that the taxes collected will be used to purchase carbon credits should not affect the predictions unless individuals derive utility from a clean environment, which could increase tax compliance.
Behavioral conjectures
This subsection provides some alternative behavioral conjectures. To do so we relax some of our assumptions. Our first conjecture concerns the efficiency of whistleblowing programs and the determinants of peer reporting decisions in the absence of monetary rewards. We conjecture that individuals who comply with the law may be willing to report tax evasion despite the absence of monetary incentives. Our intuition is based on some previous studies that have found that individuals do not hesitate to sanction free riders n the context of a voluntary contribution mechanism despite any direct monetary benefits from doing so (Fehr and Gächter, 2000; Masclet et al., 2003; Noussair and Tucker, 2005; Carpenter, 2007; Bochet et al., 2006; Nikiforakis, 2010) . Two non-strategic motives are typically evoked in the literature to explain why subjects may be willing to costly punish their peers. A first non-strategic motive relies on the fact that people react to unfair intentions by sacrificing a part of their payoffs to punish others, even when there are no gains from doing so (Rabin, 1993; Falk and Fischbacher, 1999) . A second non-strategic reason to punish group members relies on distributional concerns such as inequality aversion (Fehr and Schmidt 1999) . Precisely, individuals with distributional concerns who suffer from disadvantageous inequality may be willing to pay to punish defectors to reduce earnings inequality if the cost they bear is smaller than the impact of sanctions on the target's payoff. If the desire to punish shirkers is sufficiently high one should observe more tax compliance in the reporting treatments compared to the baseline.
However, motivations behind peer reporting are undoubtedly more complicated than peer sanctioning. Indeed, while individuals may be willing to punish themselves those who deviate from the social norm, they may be more reluctant to report them to a central authority. The reason is that some social norms prohibit tale-telling. Some studies have shed light on the existence of a norm of loyalty that prohibits denunciation and lead to the prescription of severe consequences for tattlers, such as ostracism (Greenberger et al. (1987) . 18 Indeed, in general, society does not welcome peer reporters as it breaks the social norm of loyalty (e.g., Greenberger et al. 1987; Trevino and Victor, 1992) . As group loyalty is an important social norm, the group may prefer to handle misconduct themselves rather than via peer reporting (Katz and Kahn, 1978, Greenberger et al. 1987) . 19 Consequently, while individuals may have strong desire to punish themselves shirkers, norm of loyalty may refrain them to report cheaters to the central authority. Thus, in absence of monetary rewards, individuals will report tax evaders only if the desire to punish shirkers outweighs the psychic cost of breaking the group norm of loyalty. Our conjecture summarized in conjecture 1:
Conjecture 1. a)We expect less tax evasion in the peer-reporting treatment compared to the baseline. b) participants will report cheaters if the reporting treatments if the desire to punish tax evaders outweighs the cost of deviating from the norm of loyalty.
Our second conjecture concerns the effect of monitoring of others. Many contributions have emphasized that information can have an impact on agents' decisions. The mere fact of being observed by others may be sufficient to incite individuals to shirk less: this observability brings a form of moral disapproval that may lead individuals to comply with taxation to avoid shame (e.g., Kandel and Lazear, 1992; Barron and Paulson Gjerde, 1997; Masclet et al., 2003) . Corricelli et al. (2010) found that an auditing policy that aims to shame tax evaders by publishing pictures of them reduces tax fraud significantly. However, this may be partly counterbalanced by another effect, namely the fact that observing others shirking may induce mimicry. Some individuals may then decide to cheat more if they see others cheating profusely (e.g., Fortin et al., 2007) . This is consistent with honesty being weak in the sense that it may be influenced by the observed decisions of others (e.g., Figuieres et al., 2013) . 20 As Alm et al. (1995) indicate, low compliance rates in Spain might reflect the perception that the social norm is to evade rather than to pay taxes. The observation of a strong adverse effect here might then call into question the usefulness of providing taxpayers with information about the tax-evasion rates, in particular if these are high. The net effect is unclear and is probably a function of the proportion of tax evaders in the initial period. Our conjecture here is summarized below.
Conjecture 2. we should observe less tax evasion in the monitoring treatment compared
to the baseline if "shaming" effect dominates the "mimicry" effect.
Our final conjecture concerns how information regarding the use of tax revenues affects peer reporting decisions. One may reasonably argue that the purchase of carbon credits with taxes would provide agents with an additional incentive to declare a higher proportion of their income to the tax authority to reflect the utility from contributing to a healthier environment. Indeed previous studies have shown that compliance increases when taxes are targeted to fund a public good (i.e. Alm et al.,1992) . 21 Consequently, one may expect more tax compliance in the baseline with carbon credits compared to the baseline without carbon credits. In the peer-reporting treatment with the purchase of carbon credits, we also expect higher willingness to punish those who shirk as it becomes more salient that they induce a social cost to society. This may particularly be the case if peer-reporting participants appreciate the benefits of a better environment. We thus may also conjecture that those who put a greater value on the environment will have both less incentive to evade taxes and more incentive to report tax evaders. Our third conjecture is summarized below. 20 In this model, agents' decisions to behave honestly depend on to two dimensions: a "moral ideal" and the observed decisions of others. The first captures the ideal, or "ethical," level of honestly that can be grounded in a Kantian categorical imperative or an unconditional commitment to a contribution (Laffont 1975 , Harsanyi 1980 ). The second captures social influence. 21 In the same vein, in Cowell and Gordon's (1988) equity model, economic agents receive utility from both their incomes and the public goods they receive. The central prediction of this model is that a change in the tax rate has a non-negligible impact on the provision of the public good and that this indirectly affects the tax evader's decision.
Conjecture 3. i) We should observe lower tax evasion in the tax carbon baseline treatment
compared to the baseline with no carbon credit. ii) There should be more peer reporting of shirkers in the peer-reporting carbon credit treatment compared to peer reporting with no carbon credit. iii) Individuals with higher environmental concerns should be both less likely to evade taxes and more likely to report shirkers.
The experimental results
The determinants of tax compliance
Table 2 provides descriptive statistics on gross income, declaration rates, and taxes collected in each treatment. Our data indicate that declaration rates in all treatments are significantly above the theoretical prediction of a zero tax-declaration rate. This finding is consistent with previous work indicating that a non negligible part of participants behaves honestly. Table 2 also indicates some differences across treatments. Peer reporting significantly increases declaration rates, both with and without the carbon credit. The differences in declaration rates between Baseline without carbon credits (mean: 74.7, SD=33.5) and Peer reporting without carbon credits (mean: 90.6, SD=19.4), as well as that between the Baseline with carbon credits (mean: 74.5, SD=35.1) and Peer Reporting with carbon credits (mean: 90.3, SD=20.7), are significant (p=0.0039, z=2.88 and p=0.0065, z=2.72, respectively) (see Table 3 ). Our data also indicate fewer cases of null declaration in the treatments with reporting compared to other treatments. These treatments also have a greater proportion of decisions where all income is declared. Regarding the taxes collected, Table 2 indicates that these are of the order of 17 EMU for most treatments and rise to 22 EMU under peer reporting. This 30% difference is statistically significant (t-test) at the 1% significance level. Monitoring alone compared to the baseline treatment does not significantly increase the declaration rate with or without carbon credits (p=0.6310, z=-0.48, and p=0.33, z=-0.96). The declaration rate in the monitoring without carbon credit treatment (mean; 72.9, SD= 35.7) is lower than that at baseline without carbon credits (mean: 74.7, SD=33.5). The declaration rate in the monitoring treatment with carbon credits (mean: 72.9, SD= 35.7) is also below that at baseline with carbon credits (mean: 74.5, SD=35.1). This is consistent with the negative effect of observing shirkers being somewhat larger than the positive disciplinary effect of being observed. The bottom panel of Table 3 last indicates that there are no significant differences between the treatments with and without carbon credits. It is interesting to look at individuals' different strategies and their evolution over time. With six treatments and 432 individuals playing 20 periods, it is cumbersome to describe these using traditional graphics. For this purpose, we have developed a web application allowing the visualization of individual behavior by treatment in a compact way (aggregating with and without carbon credits) over 20 periods. The results are available at http://fiscalfrauds.cirano.qc.ca. This program was developed in collaboration with Lisa Di Jorio of Silkan solutions Inc. Silkan is a company that designs and develops high-performance simulations: www.silkan.com. Two results stand out: i) tax compliance in the peer-reporting treatments is greater than in the other treatments; and ii) many participants oscillate between all or nothing strategies in reporting their income, particularly in the baseline and monitoring treatments. We can also follow the reactions of the participants who had to pay a fine for more than one period (red dots), suggesting a considerable frequency of delinquency, or who were fined for only a single period (yellow dots). Table 4 shows our estimation results for the determinants of declaration rates. We use Tobit panel models with random effects due to the panel dimension of our data (individuals make 20 decisions in each treatment in which they participate). Our use of Tobit models reflects the high percentage of censored observations. Sigma_e 0.48474*** 0.48259*** 0.49643*** 0.46912*** Sigma_u 0.46752*** 0.43876*** 0.42642*** 0.43153*** Notes: CC stands for carbon credits The standard errors are in parentheses *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. Risk-aversion is a dummy for the sure option being chosen ($5 cash) in the Lottery; age is a dummy for the participant being over 31 years old; language is a dummy for the mother tongue being French; female is a dummy for the participant being a woman; religion is a dummy for religion being important; tax morality comes from the answer to paying one's taxes is a social obligation (1 = strongly disagree -5 = strongly agree). The other control variables whose estimated coefficients are not statistically significant in any specification are the dummies for being between 25 and 30 years old, having at least one university degree, having studied economics, the experiment being in Quebec, being a student, having already participated in an experiment and trust in others, as well as the importance of the policy (1 = very unimportant -4 = very important), work is a social obligation (1 = strongly disagree -5 = strongly agree), we should raise taxes to curb pollution (1 = strongly disagree -5 = strongly agree) and global warming is a serious problem (1 = strongly disagree -5 = strongly agree).
The econometric results shown in Table 4 confirm the patterns observed in the descriptive statistics. The first column of Table 4 indicates that declaration rates are significantly higher in treatments with peer reporting. Monitoring attracts a negative estimated coefficient, which is marginally significant with carbon credits and not significant without credit carbon. These findings reject our conjecture 2 and indicates that observing others cheating might lead the individuals to cheat more which may counterbalance the shaming effect (see Fortin et al., 2007) . 23 Table 4 also indicates that an audit in the previous period reduces the declaration rate in the current period. This is consistent with previous findings (e.g., Guala and Mittone, 2005) . This may be due to a "bomb-crater effect," i.e. the erroneous belief that having been checked in one period makes it less likely that one will be audited in the next. Another possible alternative explanation may be that participants are prepared to assume more risk to recover the losses incurred during the audit (Kahneman and Tversky, 1991) . 24 The estimated coefficient on the interaction "audit in the previous period*treatment with peer reporting" is positive, statistically significant, and larger in absolute size than the coefficient on the lagged audit. As such, participants increase their declaration rates during the period following an audit in the peer-reporting treatments. We also observe that declaration rates fall with income, which simply echoes the fact that in our experiment the audit rate is higher when income is above median income. The "with and without" carbon credits distinction plays no significant role.
In the second column, we add to the econometric specification, the participants' socioeconomic characteristics and their "social" values over some dimensions related to our experiment and interaction terms (treatment*period) to investigate the dynamic of the game. 25 With the interaction terms, the estimated coefficients on the peer-reporting treatment dummies are no longer significant. The impact of peer reporting works via the trends in the declaration rate as shown by the positive and significant coefficients on the interaction "period*treatment," variables, especially for the treatment with carbon credits.
We interpret this finding as the fact that the belief that one might have been audited because of peer reporting produces higher declaration rates over time. In the peer reporting without carbon credits treatment, the declaration rate is positively correlated with the declaration rate of partners in the previous period. This variable is not significant in the monitoring treatments confirming the absence of a robust effect of monitoring on tax compliance.
Risk aversion is positively and significantly correlated with the declaration rate. 26 The sign of the interaction variable "risk-averse*treatments with peer reporting" is also positive and statistically significant at the 10% level indicating that the risk-averse participants increase their declaration rate. A possible explanation is that peer reporting adds an element of uncertainty (ambiguous risk) to the random risk of audit. Women declare more of their income than men, as do participants whose mother tongue is French. The only coefficient on values variables that is statistically significant shows that those who consider that "Paying one's taxes is a social obligation-Tax morality" have a higher declaration rate.
Columns (3) and (4) report separate estimates for treatments with and without carbon credit, respectively. There are some differences in some explanatory variables. The results
25
These values variables come from questions in the World Values Survey, which incidentally has been used in analyses of moral qualms concerning tax evasion (see, for example, Alm and Torgler, 2006) . 26 Risk-averse participants are those who opt to accept $5 to attend the experimental session rather than playing a lottery with a payoff of $0 with probability 0.5 and $12 with probability 0.5. It should be noted that this choice is offered before the experiment, but the lottery, if chosen, is only drawn after the session. from the treatments with carbon credits are similar to those in the total sample for the variables "period*treatment," "French mother tongue," "female and "the importance of paying one's taxes." The "importance of religion" variable increases the declaration rate in the sample with carbon credits, but not in the overall sample and the treatment without carbon credits. However, the "risk-aversion" variable is insignificant in the credit carbon treatments. We have no clear explanation for this finding.
The determinants of tax compliance in the first period
To what extent does the mere threat of being reported encourage individuals to declare more? We assess this by examining participants' behavior before their first audit. If the threat of an audit via peer reporting worries participants, declaration rates should be higher in treatments with peer reporting than in the other treatments before the first time the individual is audited. The four columns of Table 5 reveal that the threat of being reported suffices to increase declaration rates. Risk-aversion is a dummy for the sure option being chosen ($5 cash) in the Lottery, language is a dummy for mother tongue being French, female is a dummy for the participant being a woman, religion is a dummy for religion being important. Tax morality: Paying one's taxes is a social obligation (1 = strongly disagree -5 = strongly agree). Importance of the policy variable (1 = very unimportant -4 = very important). Control variables whose estimated coefficients are not statistically significant: dummies for the participant being between 25 and 30 years old, the participant being over 30 years old, having at least one university degree, having studied economics, being a student, having already participated in an experiment, the experiment being in Quebec, the importance of religion, and trust in others, as well as work is a social obligation (1 = strongly disagree -5 = strongly agree), we should raise taxes to curb pollution (1 = strongly disagree -5 = strongly agree), and global warming is a serious problem (1 = strongly disagree -5 = strongly agree).
Our findings are summarized in result 2 below :
Result 2 : Average declartion rate is significantly higher in the first period of teh game with peer reporting compared to other treatments, indicating that the threat of being reported is sufficient to increase declaration rates.
The determinants of peer reporting
In this section we focus our attention on the determinants of peer reporting decisions in absence of monetary rewards. Two questions are of particular interest: (i) What proportion of participants denounce other group members? (ii) What are the main motives behind peer reporting decisions? Table 6 provides information on the number of informants and their frequency of peer reporting: 89 out of 144 participants, or nearly 62 % of participants report their peers.
Nearly 21 % of them report other participants more than ten times. These proportions are not negligible. We should bear in mind that it costs 2 EMU to report a participant and that there is no reward for reporting tax evasion. In Table 7 , we examine the determinants of the probability that a participant i will report another group member j using random effect probit models to control for the panel dimension of our data. 1.15524*** 1.1626*** 0.9766*** Notes: Standard errors appear in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Age is a dummy for the participant being over 31 years old. Environment variable: Raise taxes to combat pollution (1 = strongly disagree -5 = strongly agree). Control variables whose estimated coefficients are not statistically significant: dummies for risk aversion (choosing the sure option), the participant being between 25 and 30 years old, having at least one university degree, having already participated in an experiment, the experiment being in Quebec, the participant being a woman, the importance of religion and trust in others, as well as the importance of the policy (1 = very unimportant -4 = very important), work is a social obligation (1 = strongly disagree -5 = strongly agree), paying one's taxes is a social obligation (1 = strongly disagree -5 = strongly agree), and global warming is a serious problem (1 = strongly disagree -5 = strongly agree).
The results of model (1) in Table 7 reveal that the probability of player i reporting other group member j falls with player j's declaration rate. Column (2) shows that the coefficient on other members' declaration rates is no longer significant after controlling for the difference in declaration rates between i and j. These findings tend to indicate that, in absence of rewards to report cheaters, the main motivation behind peer reporting is inequality aversion. This is consistent with previous papers that have shown that peer punihsment is mainly driven by disadvantageous inequality aversion (e.g. Fehr and Gächter, 2000b; Masclet and Villeval, 2008; Nikiforakis, 2010) . Table 7 also indicates that the probability of peer reporting declines over time. This is also consistent with the literature on peer punishment in the context of public goods showing that peer punishment declines over time as cooperation emerges. We might have imagined that richer participants would have reported more, as each peer report costs 2 EMU. This is however not the case as the estimated coefficient on income is positive, but not statistically significant. The coefficient on the "carbon credits" dummy is also not significant indicating that individuals have no additional incentive to report tax evaders when they know how tax revenues are used. Finally, interestingly, the insignificant coefficient on "lagged audit" indicates the absence of blind retaliation. The third column report estimates that control for demographics, "values" variables and the main results remain unchanged.
Our findings are summarized in result 3 :
Result 3. Peer reporting is negatively and significantly associated with others' declaration rates. Peer report decisions are mainly driven by ienquality induced by tax evasion.
Discussion and Conclusion
There are many examples in everyday life of people using peer-reporting platforms when they observe deviations from the Law or social norms. Our experiment investigates this behavior in a context of tax evasion where participants are not rewarded for peer reporting.
In particular, we asked whether whistleblower programs will reduce tax evasion.
We have five main findings.
First, our data indicate that peer reporting has a positive and significant effect on taxcompliance rates. In our experiment, tax collection in the peer-reporting treatment was 30% higher than in the other treatments. 27 28 27 In the reporting treatment, participants can observe the reported rate and thus denounce tax evaders. In reality this is not so simple, and could explain why in some countries there is a reward if the peer reporting turns out to profit the government. 28 In a sense, our results are in line with Kleven et al. (2011) , who concluded that given the cost of tax audits, resources would be better spent on third-party monitoring.
Second, the threat of being reported suffices to increase the declared income rate, as the peer-reporting treatment produces significantly higher declaration rates than the baseline treatments, even in the first period of the game.
Third, our results indicate that individuals do not hesitate to report tax evaders despite the absence of any material rewards, suggesting that the willingness to punish evaders mostly outweighs the social cost of breaking the social norm of loyalty and the associated fear of blind retaliation. Precisely, our study shed lights on the important role of non-monetary motives and particularly payoff inequality induced by tax evasion in peer reporting decisions. This is consistent with previous papers that have shown that peer punihsment is mainly driven by disadvantageous inequality aversion (e.g. Fehr and Gächter, 2000b; Masclet and Villeval, 2008; Nikiforakis, 2010) .
Fourth, monitoring alone is not sufficient to increase the probability of declaration. A possible explanation is that shaming effect is offset by a mimetic effect, whereby observing others shirking leads individual to revise their ideal moral motivation and thus evade more.
Finally, while we would have expected declaration rates to increase when taxes are not burnt but rather used to finance a global public good, we find no evidence of this in any of the treatments.
There are several political implications of our study. Altogether, our findings indicate that whistleblowing programs are effective in enhancing declaration rates and may thus complement more conventional programs based on audit and penalties. As direct monitoring is costly, the probability of being audited may be relatively low. 29 The introduction of such unconventional programs may increase the probability of being detected for shirkers by adding an element of ambiguity to the likelihood of being audited.
These programs introduce an element of uncertainty (ambiguity) by not knowing the exact probability of being denounced. Snow and Warren (2005) 
develop a theoretical model
showing that an increase in uncertainty about the probability of being audited increases (reduces) tax compliance for ambiguity-averse (ambiguity-loving) taxpayers. Furthermore, some contributions have shown that, although the audit rate may be low, what matters is not the audit rate per se but rather the perceived likelihood of being audited (Andreoni et al., 1998) . The tax administration may benefit from publicizing whistleblower programs to increase the perceived likelihood of an audit.
We should however be careful in interpreting and extrapolating our findings.
First, governments may hesitate to implement whistleblower programs widely not for reasons in term of efficiency but for ethical and political reasons. The main obstacle may be related to the social norm of loyalty that prevents individuals from peer reporting. Such reluctance may be particularly entrenched among societies that have experienced the plague of denunciations and the proliferation of informers identified by the Resistance as one of the greatest threats to the internal cohesion of society under the German occupation, as in Poland or France (Grawboski, 2013) . The irony here is that peer reporters may at the same time be seen as strongly ethical since tax evasion is unfair but also considered as disloyal by their peers (Trevino and Victor, 1992) .
A second main obstacle to the implementation of peer reporting programs is the risk of false reporting for adverse personal reasons. This kind of false reporting may produce considerable verification costs for the tax administration: if everybody were to denounce everybody else, the actual enforcement probability would remain unchanged. Authorities need to take sufficient precautions to avoid such indirect negative effects by explicitly stating that false reporting will be strongly punished. Furthermore, it should be made clear that peer reporting should not attempt to resolve personal problems. The American IRS peer-reporting program provides a good illustration of this precaution, stating that "the IRS is looking for solid information, not an "educated guess" or unsupported speculation. We are also looking for a significant Federal tax issue -this is not a program for resolving personal problems or disputes about a business relationship." 30 If these precautions are not taken, the remedy may do more harm than good. 30 These mechanisms may be detrimental if they lead to calumny or individuals reporting their peers for unethical reasons. A number of experimental contributions have underlined the importance of anti-social Another limitation of this study is that the effect of norm of loyalty was probably under estimated in our study. This is due to the fact that groups of peers were created artificially in the experiment such that the cost from deviating from a norm of loyalty may be rather weak. We acknowledge that in real life, individuals may be less reluctant to break the norm of loyalty. To check this, a possible extension of this work may consist in running the same experiment with groups of "real" peers to test this conjecture.
There are a number of issues that were beyond the scope of this paper that could be addressed in future research.
An extension of our work may consist in relaxing some of our hypotheses. In particular, we did not allow participants to observe others' peer reporting activities and thus to directly identify reporters. Thus only blind retaliation was possible, i.e., a reaction to having been audited in the previous period. This may explain why we did not find any evidence of revenge (e.g., Soeken, 1987) . A possible extension is to introduce the opportunity to observe individual peer-reporting activities.
Another natural extension of this work would consist in relaxing the assumption of perfect monitoring. Indeed we have assumed that individuals can observe their peers perfectly and without cost. This assumes that agents have privileged information due to their proximity to others. This may hold for individuals observing their neighborhood behaving unethically, an employee observing her employer evading taxes, and so forth. We may, however, relax this assumption by considering that information is imperfect and costly.
Another question for future research is to what extent rewards for whistleblowing increase the program's efficiency. In this current study, we deliberately ignored the possibility of rewarding reporters, as we focused on the non-monetary factors behind peer reporting, assuming that individuals are mainly motivated by the desire to punish evaders. However, in most of cases, tax authorities pay money to those who blow the whistle on evaders. For instance, the IRS Whistleblower Office can award the whistleblower up to 30 percent of behaviors such as nastiness (Abbink and Sadrieh, 2009 ) and envy via the willingness to burn money (Zizzo, and Oswald, 2001; Zizzo, 2003) . the additional tax, penalty and other amounts it collects if the IRS uses the information provided by the whistleblower. How large should rewards be? Our data suggest that individuals are mainly motivated by personal reasons to inform the tax administration. So why should the government pay informants? An implication of our findings is that a priori the rewards for those who blow the whistle on taxpayers who underreport their tax liabilities do not need to be too high to make whistleblower program efficient as reporters are mainly motivated by non monetary factors. It would be of interest to test whether rewards have a significant impact on tax evasion. Whether incentivized schemes are more efficient than non-incentivized schemes is a priori unclear. Indeed although monetary rewards may incite individuals to engage in more peer reporting, rewards may also crowd out the intrinsic motivation to punish shirkers (Frey and Jegen, 2001) . Butlery et al. (2017) , in their study of whistleblowing by employees, found that rewarding whistleblowers is broadly effective and that the crowding-out of non-pecuniary motivations is a priori not a big concern. It remains that crowding out effects may exist and thus it remains an empirical question to be addressed in future research.
Information about the other members of your group
When you have filed your income declaration, you will be told how much income each of the three other members of your group have declared. In this situation, you have the option of informing on any participants as having under-reported their income. They will automatically be audited. Observe that each instance of reporting tax fraud costs 2 EMU.
Note: reporting tax fraud is anonymous. In other words, individuals who are audited will not know whether it is because they were reported or because they were selected in keeping with the probability of an audit.
We remind you that you will be in the same group for all 20 periods of the game.
Auditing of accounts
The government does not know exactly what your total income is. Only you have that information.
There are two possibilities:
• Case 1. You were not informed on by a member of your group. In this case, the government audits some accounts randomly. The government could audit your account and the accounts of all individuals in the room, and thus know your total income. However, this is very expensive and wasteful if you declared all your income. Therefore, the government audits certain accounts drawn at random. The probability of being audited is determined as follows:
o If your declared income is in the bottom 50% of the incomes declared by the 12 participants, the probability of being audited is 20%.
o If your declared income is among those that strictly exceed 50% of the incomes declared by the 12 participants, the probability of being audited is 10%.
• Case 2. You were reported by a member of your group. In this case, you will automatically be audited by the government.
In both cases, if an audit reveals that you under-declared your total income, you must pay (1) the back taxes on the undeclared income, and (2) a fine corresponding to 50% of those back taxes-for a total amount of 1.5 times the value of the evaded taxes.
Furthermore, you will automatically be audited for the two preceding periods. If you underdeclared in either of those two periods, you will also pay 1.5 times the tax amount owing. Thus, for the period during which you were audited, your "final net income" will be equal to your total income -taxes paid on declared income -the sum of back taxes and fines for the current period (t) and the two previous periods (t -1 and t -2), if applicable, and the costs associated with reporting the members of your group, if applicable. Observe that you cannot be audited-and consequently fined-twice for the same period.
How are your earnings determined?
In each period, your "final net income" is calculated by the computer as follows:
• If you are not audited: Since taxes on declared income are 40% of declared income, taxes on undeclared income (payable in the event of an audit) correspond to: 40 % × (total income -declared income). Finally, fines correspond to 50% of taxes on undeclared income. In other words, under these conditions, you pay 1.5 times the amount of the taxes you evaded (note that the program rounds decimals). We remind you that each time you inform on someone, it costs you 2 EMU.
At the end of the experimental session, you randomly select a number that corresponds to one of the periods played. Each number is equally likely to be picked. Your earnings in EMU for that period will be converted at the rate of 1 EMU = $0.40 CAN. Observe that any income that has been reduced below zero by fines will be set to zero. You cannot lose money in this game.
Furthermore, at the end of the experiment the taxes paid by all 12 participants during a given period, also drawn at random, will be invested in buying carbon credits online. The amounts paid in taxes in EMU will be converted at the rate of 1 EMU = $0.40 CAN, just like for your personal payment. We will buy these credits online at http://planetair.ca. One tonne of carbon offset of the type "Gold Standard carbon offset" costs approximately $40 and is the highest quality available (see http://www.cdmgoldstandard.org).
N.B.:
You will receive an e-mail attestation to the purchase of carbon credits corresponding to the taxes raised.
Additional information
We encourage you to reread these instructions. After taking your seat at your computer, please raise your hand if you have any questions regarding these instructions. We will enquire about your question in private and then share the question and its answer with all participants. Questions must not be intended to validate a decision-making strategy, but rather to obtain a better understanding of the instructions.
Before beginning the experiment we will ask some questions regarding your age, sex, level and field of study, universities or schools currently attended, your labour market status, and whether you have already participated in this type of experiment. This information will remain anonymous. We are ready to start the experiment.
We will also ask you some questions to assess your understanding of these instructions.
